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THE “PRINCIPAL” REASON WHY THE PCAOB IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Constitution creates very few federal offices. It creates the House and Senate, 1 the Speaker of the House 2 and the President

pro tempore of the Senate, 3 the President, 4 the Vice President, 5 and the Supreme Court 6 --and that is it. The Constitution

clearly contemplates that there will be other federal “Officers,” who the President must commission 7 and who Congress may

impeach and remove, 8 but the document does not itself create those positions. Instead, it provides general authorization to

Congress (in conjunction with the President's presentment power 9 and the Vice President's modest voting authority 10 ) to “make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the enumerated powers of national institutions, 11
which plainly includes the authority to create federal positions.

The Constitution specifies, in quite gruesome detail, how Congress, the President, and the Vice President are to be selected

for *74 office. Indeed, judging by the number of provisions devoted to the subject, 12 it is clearly the central concern of the
document. With respect to appointment, however, the Constitution only directs that the officers of Congress other than the Vice
President shall be chosen by each branch of Congress, 13 that the States get to choose the officers of the militia, 14 and that
the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 15

Under this clause, non-inferior, or principal, officers must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate; whereas inferior officers may be appointed by the President, the courts of law, or heads of departments without Senate
confirmation if Congress so specifies. And if someone within the federal government does not fall anywhere within the class
of persons described in this clause, presumably that person's appointment can be fixed by Congress in any manner that is
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” federal powers.
The members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) are, as Professor Strauss points out in his

characteristically elegant introduction to this symposium, 16 conceded by all parties in this case to be “Officers of the United
States” under the Appointments Clause. It is true that Congress has specifically declared in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that the
PCAOB “shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government” and “[n]o member or person employed
by, or agent for, the Board shall be deemed to be an officer or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason
of such service,” 17 but Congress is not a party to this case. And as a matter of substance, Congress's declaration is about as
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interesting and profound as would be a similar legislative declaration that, for example, FBI agents are not government officials

*75 for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 18 The members of the PCAOB, with power to regulate the entire corporate audit

process, undeniably exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” 19 and that makes them officers
for Appointments Clause purposes.

The PCAOB members are appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 20 If the PCAOB members are principal
officers, their appointments are flagrantly unconstitutional. If they are inferior officers, their appointments are permissible if
(1) the SEC counts as a “Department[]” under the Appointments Clause and (2) the five members of the SEC can collectively

qualify as a “Head[]” of a department. The petitioners in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB 21 insist that the PCAOB members
are principal officers because at least some of their functions are not supervised by any executive officer and the scope of
their duties are sufficiently broad to foreclose classification as inferior officers. They also maintain that, even if the PCAOB
members are inferior officers, an independent agency such as the SEC cannot be a “Department[]” and a collective body (as
opposed to a unitary Chairperson of an agency) cannot be a departmental “Head[].”
It is clear (at least to me) that the members of the PCAOB are principal officers who must be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate. This is true for three independent reasons: (1) the members of the PCAOB are
not fully subject to the control and supervision of other officers; (2) the scope and nature of their duties, independent of the
degree of supervision to which they are subject, make them principal officers; and (3) the members of the PCAOB are “Heads
of Departments” under the Appointments Clause and are therefore necessarily principal officers. The third argument was not
advanced by the Free Enterprise Fund--and indeed contradicts its position that a “Department[]” under the Appointments Clause
must be a Cabinet-like entity--but it may well be the strongest argument against the current structure of the PCAOB.
*76 I
Start with the problem of control and supervision. As former Administrative Law Professor Scalia 22 pointed out in Edmond

v. United States, 23 if an officer is not controlled and supervised by any other officer, it is difficult to see in what respect that

officer is “inferior.” 24 Careful study of the original meaning 25 of the term “inferior” in the Appointments Clause shows that
Professor Scalia was right.
The standard, and therefore presumptive, eighteenth-century meaning of the term “inferior” describes a hierarchical relationship.
The leading eighteenth-century dictionary defined “inferiour” as “1. Lower in place. 2. Lower in station or rank of life. 3. Lower
in value or excellency. 4. Subordinate.” 26 This is consistent with the Latin root “inferus,” which means “below or beneath.” 27

Given the prevalence of knowledge of Latin among the educated members of the founding generation, 28 a reasonable reader of
the Constitution would construe the Appointments Clause to require an inferior officer to be subordinate to some other officer.
This conclusion is reinforced by the Constitution's other explicit and implicit uses of the term “inferior.” The Article III Vesting

Clause distinguishes the “supreme Court” from “inferior Courts.” 29 Lower federal courts are “inferior” to the Supreme Court
because they are subject to the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. If lower courts could decide cases free of Supreme
Court supervision, they would be “coordinate” rather than “inferior” courts. Similarly, federal *77 laws are “the supreme Law
of the Land,” 30 and contrary state laws are thus implicitly “inferior,” because federal law hierarchically prevails over state
law in the event of conflict.
In sum, the Constitution repeatedly uses terms like “inferior” and “supreme” to describe hierarchical relationships. In this
respect, Edmond was right: officers who do not answer to other officers are necessarily principal officers.
The SEC has review power over the PCAOB's rules and sanctions, but it has no specific statutory power to direct, supervise,
or review the PCAOB's investigative and enforcement decisions, which are precisely the decisions of the PCAOB to which
the Free Enterprise Fund has been subjected. The fact that there are other powers of the PCAOB that are subject to active
SEC control is irrelevant. A principal officer does not become inferior simply by being given additional authority over which
© 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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other officers exercise control. The Attorney General, for example, is clearly a principal officer, with considerable authority
that is subject to control and direction only by the President. If Congress added to the Attorney General's authority statutory
decision-making power over all functions now entrusted to the various Cabinet agencies, but subject to the direct control and
supervision of the heads of those agencies, it would not turn the Attorney General into an inferior officer simply because he or
she now had considerable authority subject to the control and supervision of other officers. The key consideration in determining
principal officer status is not the percentage or amount of an officer's authority that is subject to the control or supervision of
some other officer but the presence of some significant authority that is not so subject. Therefore, even if many of the functions
of the PCAOB are subject to the control and supervision of other officers, the PCAOB members are still principal rather than
inferior officers so long as there are significant functions for which no such control or supervision exists--and the PCAOB's
investigative, examining, and enforcement functions are not controlled and supervised by the SEC.
II
Suppose, however, that one could twist the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to give the SEC control and supervision over even the
investigative and enforcement functions of the PCAOB, so that there is literally no authority of consequence exercised by the

PCAOB that is not under *78 the direction of the SEC. 31 The PCAOB members would still be principal officers because
of the nature and scope of their authority. Answerability to another officer is a necessary condition of inferior officer status,
but it is not necessarily a sufficient condition.
The primary eighteenth-century meaning of “inferior,” both in general and in the specific context of Article II, involves a
hierarchical relationship of subordination and control. That is not, however, the only way in which the term “inferior” was used
during the founding era--and in particular not the only way in which it was used in connection with governmental authority. In
the late eighteenth century, a court whose decisions were not subject to review by any other court could nonetheless sometimes

be called an “inferior court” if its jurisdiction or geographic scope was limited in some important respect. 32 Indeed, a number
of states during the founding era had nonhierarchical court systems in which the label “supreme” did not necessarily connote
ultimate decisional authority and the label “inferior” did not necessarily connote decisional subordination but instead described
scope of authority. 33 An early draft of Article III proposed creating “one or more supreme tribunals,” 34 which makes sense
only if “supreme,” and therefore “inferior,” can sometimes have a nonhierarchical meaning.
For the reasons given above, and some additional reasons given below, it is not plausible to think that either Article II or

Article III adopted this authority-based understanding of inferiority wholesale. 35 The textual and structural evidence for a
hierarchical understanding of inferiority in the Constitution is quite potent. But that does not mean that the authority-based
alternative understanding must disappear quietly into the night. One way to accommodate both understandings is to treat them
as independently sufficient alternative routes to inferiority: an officer who is not subordinate can never be inferior, but an officer
who is subordinate (and is therefore presumptively “inferior” in the primary sense) could nonetheless be principal because of
the nature of his or her duties. For example, the *79 Solicitor General is hierarchically subordinate to the Attorney General,
who is “the head of the Department of Justice” 36 and can displace or direct the Solicitor General in the representation of the

United States. 37 But given the Solicitor General's pervasive role in the conduct of litigation on behalf of the United States, it
seems quite sensible to conclude that he or she is a principal officer notwithstanding the hierarchical superiority of the Attorney
General. The same might be said, for the same reasons, of the Deputy Attorneys General. 38

If this dual-track vision of inferiority is correct, there is a very strong case that the PCAOB members are principal officers,
given the enormous power with which they are vested. All public auditors must register with and provide information to the

PCAOB, 39 and the PCAOB “shall assess and collect a registration fee and an annual fee from each registered public accounting
firm, in amounts that are sufficient to recover the costs of processing and reviewing applications and annual reports.” 40 The
PCAOB has authority to promulgate rules establishing “such auditing and related attestation standards, such quality control
standards, and such ethics standards to be used by registered public accounting firms in the preparation and issuance of audit
reports, as required by this Act or the rules of the Commission, or as may be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.” 41 The PCAOB, in other words, has authority to regulate virtually every aspect of the public
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auditing process. The PCAOB is further empowered to inspect, investigate, and discipline all registered public accounting

firms, 42 and the power to discipline includes the power to impose substantial civil fines. 43 These powers extend to the entirety
of the public auditing process, throughout the country and across all businesses. These powers are obviously enough to make the
PCAOB members “Officers of the United States.” They are also plausibly enough to make them principal officers regardless
of their relationship to the SEC.
“[P]lausibly enough,” of course, is not the same thing as “enough.” It may be plausible to think that an authority-based *80
understanding of inferiority infuses the Appointments Clause, but is it right so to think?
One consideration modestly in favor of so thinking is that persons as diverse as Justice Scalia and Justice Souter have both so

thought. 44 As evidence of original meaning, however, this is very thin. I do not see a knock-down argument in either direction
on this point. In the end, the balance tips in favor of the dual-track version of inferiority, but in order to make that case, one
more set of considerations, which also independently supports another argument for the unconstitutionality of the PCAOB,
must be put into play.
III
If the PCAOB members are inferior officers, their appointments by the SEC are proper if the SEC is a “Department[]” under the
Appointments Clause and the SEC commissioners, as a collective body, are the “Head[]” of that department. Drawing heavily
on the majority opinion in Freytag v. Commissioner, 45 which sought to “confin[e] the term ‘Heads of Departments' in the

Appointments Clause to executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments,” 46 the Free Enterprise Fund argues vigorously

that the SEC is not a constitutional “Department[]” (a proposition specifically reserved by the Court in Freytag 47 ) and that
a collective group of people cannot be a departmental “Head[].” I think that they are wrong on both counts but right in their
ultimate conclusion. The PCAOB is a constitutional “Department[],” its members are constitutional “Heads of Departments,”
and a constitutional department head is necessarily a principal officer.

Take the last proposition first. The Appointments Clause does not explicitly state that “Heads of Departments” are principal
officers. But structurally, the conclusion is hard to avoid. The Appointments Clause sets forth a default rule of presidential
nomination and senatorial confirmation for all “Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for” and then allows Congress to “vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” There is nothing logically impossible about *81 vesting the
appointment of inferior officers in other inferior officers, but it certainly looks odd given the phrasing of the Appointments
Clause. “[T]he fact that the Appointments Clause singles out two classes of officers (other than the President) as permissible
appointing authorities certainly suggests that these officers do not themselves fall into the class of inferior officers who may

be appointed without Senate confirmation.” 48 This conclusion is reinforced, if not utterly confirmed, by the Opinions Clause,
which authorizes the President to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments,
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices ...” 49 The Opinions Clause plainly contemplates that the
“Heads of Departments” will be “principal Officer[s].” The final nail is provided by the linguistic meaning of “head” in the
context of the Appointments Clause. Samuel Johnson's dictionary defined “head” as “Chief; principal person; one to whom
the rest are subordinate; leader; commander.” 50 The head of a federal department is a principal officer.

As for the second proposition, the PCAOB is a constitutional “Department [].” A “department,” according to Samuel Johnson,

is a “separate allotment; province or business assigned to a particular person.” 51 Noah Webster's dictionary carried through this
meaning of “department” into 1828, defining a department as a “separate allotment or part of business; a distinct province, in

which a class of duties are allotted to a particular person.” 52 Justice Scalia invoked Webster in his concurring opinion (joined
by three other Justices) in Freytag, in which he noted that “the Founders ... chose the word ‘Departmen[t],’ ... not to connote

size or function (much less Cabinet status), but separate organization.” 53 An executive department, accordingly, is any unit that
has a significant degree of organizational identity and responsibility. Anyone at the apex of such an organization is a head of a
department and therefore a principal officer who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
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Nothing in the eighteenth-century definition of a “department” makes reference to a hierarchical relationship between a
department and other institutions. In other words, whether an organizational unit *82 is a “department” does not depend on
whether or not it is part of, or answerable to, another department. A federal entity can be a constitutional “department” even if
it is part of a larger organizational unit--just as an entity can be an “agency” under the Administrative Procedure Act “whether
or not it is within or subject to review by another agency.” 54

By the same token, not every identifiable executive unit (e.g., the Freedom of Information Act compliance unit within an agency
general counsel's office) is a “department” whose “head” is a principal officer. An entity must have a certain degree and kind
of identity and authority in order to qualify as a constitutional “department” and thus require its head to be appointed by the
President with the Senate's advice and consent. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for departmental status that a
governmental unit have a recognizable identity as a distinct organization. Units with such organizational identity and decisional
autonomy are clearly departments. Units with organizational identity, without decisional autonomy, but with powers that cannot
be dismissed as lesser or lower are departments as well.
I would state the ultimate test for departmental status as follows: a unit of the federal executive is a constitutional “Department[]”
under the Appointments Clause if it has sufficient organizational identity and decisional authority to be a constitutional
“Department[]” under the Appointments Clause.
If that sounds absurdly circular to you, then you are half-right: it is circular, but not absurdly so. A great many crucial questions
in structural constitutionalism ultimately come down to “I know it when I see it.” Consider the definition of an “Officer.” When
Buckley says that an officer is someone who exercises “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” (as
opposed to insignificant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States), is it saying anything other than that an officer is a
federal official who is important enough to be an officer? And isn't that obviously the right answer? In 2007, the Office of Legal

Counsel (“OLC”) tried to provide a more precise definition of “Officer,” 55 but I doubt whether it advanced the ball very far.
The OLC memo concluded that “a position, however labeled, is in fact a federal office if (1) it is invested by legal authority with
a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal Government, and *83 (2) it is ‘continuing.”’ 56 Delegated sovereign power

is legally-binding power “to administer, execute, or interpret the law” 57 or to perform certain other functions traditionally

associated with the executive arm of the national government such as military affairs and the conduct of diplomacy. 58 The
requirement that a position be “continuing” was no doubt included to account for Auffmordt v. Hedden, which held that a

merchant appraiser hired by the Customs Service was not an officer. 59 Additionally, many special agents, envoys, and qui
tam litigants have existed through the years, and it would be awkward for the Justice Department to declare these entities
unconstitutional en masse. But the OLC memorandum makes very clear that “continuing” does not mean “permanent”: “a
temporary position may also be ‘continuing,’ if it is not personal, ‘transient,’ or ‘incidental.”’ 60 When all is said and done,
after forty pages, the OLC's definition does not-- nor could it plausibly--differ markedly from the definition of an officer as
someone important enough to be an officer.

Similarly, I have spent a great deal of time elsewhere defending the proposition that the nondelegation doctrine, properly
understood, requires Congress to make those decisions that are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme in question so that
Congress must make them. 61 Some constitutional questions just do not lend themselves to bright-line definitions but require
all-things-considered judgments. The question whether a federal entity is a “Department[]” is just such a question.

Fortunately, the PCAOB presents a relatively easy case for departmental status. The PCAOB's organizational identity is
established by its authority to appear in court with its own counsel, 62 to conduct operations in any State, 63 to appoint

employees, 64 to enter into contracts, 65 and (perhaps most tellingly) “to allocate, assess, and collect accounting support fees

established pursuant to section 109, for the Board, and other fees and charges imposed under this title.” 66 The PCAOB's

extensive regulatory powers have been described *84 elsewhere. 67 While there is no definitive way to determine whether an
entity is identifiable and important enough to be a “Department[],” there is a pretty good case for the PCAOB.

© 2022 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

5

THE “PRINCIPAL” REASON WHY THE PCAOB IS..., 62 Vand. L. Rev. En...

The head of PCAOB must therefore be a principal officer appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. For present purposes, it does not matter whether that head must be (as Free Enterprise Fund claims) the Chairperson
of the PCAOB or whether the PCAOB as a collective entity could serve that role. 68 In either case, the present structure of
the PCAOB is unconstitutional.

What to make of the fact that five Justices of the Supreme Court took a very different view of the term “Department[]” in
Freytag? If one is looking for right answers to constitutional questions rather than predictions of court outcomes--nothing at all.

Footnotes
a1

Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. This Essay draws upon and extends an argument made in an
amicus brief, co-authored with Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, filed in the Supreme Court in support of
the petitioners in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. I am grateful to participants at
a workshop at Boston University School of Law for comments and to the Abraham & Lillian Benton Fund for support.

1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.

2

Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.

3

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.

4

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.

5

Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.

6

Id. art. III, § 1.

7

Id. art. II, § 3.

8

Id. art. II, § 4.

9

Id. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.

10

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote,
unless they be equally divided.”).

11

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 18. One must refer to the power of “national institutions” rather than “the national government” because
the Constitution vests no power at all in the national government simpliciter. Every grant of power is a grant to a specific
actor or institution within the national government.

12

I count at least 22, plus 11 amendments. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 126 (5th ed.
2009).
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13

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. I do not address the thorny question whether congressional officers
are “Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause or for other purposes.

14

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.

15

Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

16

Peter L. Strauss, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
51, 59 (2009).

17
18
19
20

21
22

23
24

15 U.S.C. § 7211(b) (2006).
See

Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995).

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4). The statute requires the Commission to consult with the Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury before making any appointments, id., but does not
actually require the Commission to do anything specific with the results of that consultation.
537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2378 (2009).
The title “former Administrative Law Professor” is without question a better credential for reaching a correct answer
on a constitutional issue than is the title “Supreme Court Justice.”
520 U.S. 651 (1997).
See

Id. at 662-63.

25

I use the term “original meaning” to describe the meaning that a documentary provision would have had to a hypothetical
reasonable and fully-informed observer at the time of the provision's enactment. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 47 (2006). The specific thoughts or intentions of
concrete historical actors can be relevant to original meaning but are not constitutive--or even necessarily very good
evidence--of it.

26

1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755).

27

THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 525 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988).
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28

“Latin was an essential part of the education of virtually every schooled person in the founding generation. For this
reason, and also because that generation was closer to the time when Latin was commonly spoken, the founders' English
usage was influenced heavily by the older tongue.” Robert G. Natelson, Federal Land Retention and the Constitution's
Property Clause: The Original Understanding, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 327, 334 n.28 (2005).

29

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (giving Congress power “to constitute Tribunals inferior to the
supreme Court”).

30

Id. art. VI, cl. 2.

31

See

Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 675-76 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (attempting precisely such a twist).

32

See David E. Engdahl, What's in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme” Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457,
466-72 (1991).

33

See id. at 468-72.

34

1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).

35

For general discussion of this point, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction
Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1015-22
(2007).

36

28 U.S.C. § 503.

37

Id. § 518.

38

Id. § 504

39
40

15 U.S.C. § 7212(a)-

(d).

Id. § 7212(f); see also Id. § 7219(d)-(g) (describing the Board's authority to impose, allocate, and collect fees).

41

Id. § 7213(a)(1).

42

Id. §§ 7214-15.

43

Id. § 7215(c)(4)(D).
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44

See

Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 667 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 722 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45

501 U.S. 868 (1991).

46

Id. at 886.

47

Id. at 887 n.4.

48

Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 35, at 1019.

49

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

50

JOHNSON, supra note 26.

51

Id.

52

1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 59 (1828).

53
54

501 U.S. at 920 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
5 U.S.C. § 551(1).

55

See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. Off. Legal Counsel (Apr. 16,
2007), http:// www.usdoj.gov/olc/2007/appointmentsclausev10.pdf [hereinafter Officers of the United States].

56

Id. at 1.

57

Id. at 11.

58

Id. at 13-14.

59

137 U.S. 326-27 (1890).

60

Officers of the United States, supra note 55, at 21.

61

See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 376-78 (2002).
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62
63

15 U.S.C. § 7211(f)(1).
Id. § 7211(f)(2).

64

Id. § 7211(f)(4).

65

Id. § 7211(f)(6).

66

Id. 7211(f)(5).

67

See supra Part II.

68

Cutting in favor of Free Enterprise Fund's position is the Opinions Clause, which clearly contemplates that there will be
a single “principal Officer” in each department. Cutting against that position is the implausibility of a constitutional rule
requiring executive agencies to have only one principal officer. Without the cross-reference from the Opinions Clause,
it is hard to see why there could not be more than one head of a department if Congress chooses to create that structure.
Perhaps one could argue that it could never be “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” federal powers to
have a collective head of an agency, but that is a tough argument to make.
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